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INTRODUCTION  
According to the Milliman 2015 Public Pension Study, the Unfunded Accrued Liability for the 
100 largest U.S. public pension plans was $1.20 trillion and the median funded ratio of the 
market assets was 71.7% (Sielman, 2015).  The ten largest retirement systems made up nearly 
40% of the total Accrued Liability (Sielman, 2015). The California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation’s largest public retirement system, was included in 
this study and had a market value of $301.1 billion in 2015 (CalPERS, 2015a).  California State 
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), the second largest public retirement system listed in 
the study, had a market value of $191.4 billion (CalSTRS, 2015).  According to the Public Policy 
Institute of California, the two plans cover 65% of the four million State, county and local 
employees who are members in California’s public retirement systems (Cook, 2015a).  Both of 
these plans have significant Unfunded Liabilities that contributed to the funding gap described in 
the Milliman report.  CalPERS reported $93.5 billion of Unfunded Liabilities based on the June 
30, 2014 valuation and CalSTRS reported $73.7 billion of Unfunded Liabilities for that same 
year (Cook, 2015a).   
Local governments provide nearly 60% of the employer’s contribution in the public 
pensions (Cook, 2015b) and as the contribution rates continue to rise, the local governments will 
be faced with costly bills that will be difficult to afford.  Even as the economy improves, 
California local governments’ revenues are expected to grow slowly.  The Legislative Analyst’s 
Office showed a 6.4% growth in 2015-2016 from the prior year for the big three General Fund 
revenues (Personal Income Tax,  Sales and Use Tax, and Corporation Tax) and then with 
projected growth rates of 3.0%, 4.5%, 1.7%, and 2.2% in subsequent years (Legislative Analyst’s 
Office, 2015).  Increasing taxes and fees, reducing services, and /or borrowing money are some 
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of the tools the governments has to pay for the higher pension costs.  The State and local 
governments in California will be challenged to fund essential services such as public safety and 
public schools and still make the required employer contributions for the public pensions as 
required by law.  A high Net Pension Liability will result in lower credit ratings, and thus it will 
be costlier for the governments to borrow money for capital programs and other purposes. 
This research will examine from a financial standpoint the financial status of CalPERS’ 
defined benefit plan only, not the plan’s other post-retirement employee benefits.  This report 
contains an overview of CalPERS, along with information about Defined Pension Plans and key 
legislation and accounting guidelines influencing the public retirement systems.  This research 
project benchmarked CalPERS against the Teacher Retirement System of Texas, Florida 
Retirement System, and the New York State and Local Retirement System, which all have a 
Funded Status of over 80%.  Significant observations were made about the framework of the four 
public retirement systems that can help the CalPERS and the other public retirement systems 
achieve a sustainable future.   This research will examine how CalPERS can achieve the 
sufficient investment returns necessary to ensure the payout of future benefits to its members at 
the appropriate cost to employers and employees.  
 
BACKGROUND  
Overview of CalPERS 
CalPERS had a total of 1.8 million members, with 48% active members (869,000), 34% retirees 
and beneficiaries (611,000), and 18% inactive members (336,000) as of June 30, 2015.   
CalPERS’ membership is comprised of three large categories of employees.  The classified (non-
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teaching) school employees make up the “School” membership (38%); State employees, 
including ones from the California State University, make up the “State” membership (31%); and 
employees of local governments make up the “Public Agency” membership (31%).  Certified 
teachers and administrators in K-12 and instructors in community colleges are typically in 
CalSTRS.  CalPERS is a cost-sharing, multi-employer pension plan and is comprised of the State 
of California, along with close to 3,007 employers in California who contract with CalPERS for 
their pension and health benefits (CalPERS, 2016a).  Examples of employers in this area that 
participate in CalPERS are Santa Clara County and almost all cities in Santa Clara and San 
Mateo counties, with the exception of San Jose that has its own separate pension system 
(CalPERS, 2015a).   
 The average monthly pension payment for all service retirees in 2014-2015 was $2,627 
and these retirees had an average of just over 20 years of service (CalPERS, 2016b).  The 
monthly payments may be the only source of income for the retirees, as not all public employees 
in California are covered by Social Security.  The following group of employees do not pay into 
Social Security and therefore have no Social Security coverage:  California Highway Patrol 
(CHP), teachers, state firefighters, correctional officers, and judges, as well as the employees of 
more than 450 cities, counties and special districts (Mendel, 2009).  The Windfall Elimination 
Provision of the Social Security Act states that for the rest of the employees who are covered by 
Social Security, the calculation of Social Security benefits may be reduced to avoid “double-
dipping”.  This would apply if an employee paid into Social Security in a previous employment 
and then started a career in the public sector and did not continue to pay into Social Security 
while employed in the public sector (CalSTRS, n.d.). 
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 The assets and liabilities of CalPERS are combined across numerous employers and 
multiple generations of employees, and the risks and gains are shared by this pool of long-term 
investors.  CalPERS is by far the largest public retirement system in California with 38% of the 
total assets, followed by CalSTRS with 26%, and University of California’s Defined Benefit 
Plan with 7%.  The top ten largest public retirement systems make up 88.5% of all systems in 
this category.  The asset distribution was State, 74.1%; counties, 15.9%; cities, 9.3%; special 
districts, 0.6%; and other, 0.1%.  Of the 131 public retirement systems that filed their reports 
with the State Controller’s Office for 2010-2011, 86 systems were Defined Benefit Plans and 45 
were Defined Contribution Plans.  There are six statewide pension plans in California, comprised 
of CalPERS, CalSTRS, the University of California Retirement System, and the remaining three 
plans are small and include judges and legislators.  Fiscal year 2010-2011 was the latest Public 
Retirement Systems Annual Report available from the State Controller’s Office. (California State 
Controller’s Office, 2011).   
     CalPERS is also the largest public retirement system nation-wide, with $301.1 billion in 
assets.  CalSTRS had $191.4 billion of assets and New York State and Local Employees 
Retirement System ($184.5 billion) followed closely behind.   The Florida Retirement System 
($148.0 billion) was the fourth largest and the Teachers Retirement System of Texas ($127.9 
billion) rounded out the top five largest public retirement systems.  
Defined Benefits Plans 
Retirement benefits are promised for a lifetime in a Defined Benefits (DB) plan.  The monthly 
DB allowance is calculated by multiplying the employee’s years of service, a benefit factor and 
final average salary (highest average in a 12 or 36 months period).  The DB formula is set by 
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contract negotiations with the unions and through legislation.  The most common formula for the 
monthly DB allowance in CalPERS for non-safety members is 2% of the final average salary at 
55 years old and for safety members, 3% of the final year salary at 50 years old (CalPERS, 
2014a).   
In contrast, in a Defined Contribution plan, the only thing promised to the employee is that the 
employer will contribute a defined amount each year during employment.  This money, along 
with the employee’s contribution, is invested in a fund similar to a 401(k) that the employee 
controls.  The amount the employee receives upon retirement depends on the total amount 
contributed and the earnings on the investments.  The employee bears the entire risk of the 
investments and the responsibility for their management (CalPERS, 2014a).   
In a DB plan, the retiree receives a monthly allowance which is guaranteed by the 
government and ultimately by the taxpayers.  This future cost or Projected Benefit Obligations 
(PBO) should be set aside or accrued today 
so that the monthly allowances can be paid 
to the employee when he retires.  The 
liability or PBO is calculated by actuaries 
based on the demographics of the employee 
group (e.g., average retirement age, life 
expectancies, turnover rates, morbidity) 
and other economic assumptions such as 
rate of return, projected rate of inflation, wage increases and promotions (Kilgour, 2013).    The 
contributions towards the PBO made by the employer and employees, plus investment income, 
Figure 1 Contribution and investment incomes pay for the pension benefits 
Source: CalPERS. (2013). ALM Workshop – Attachment 1 – CalPERS.   
 
10 | P a g e  
 
are used to pay for the monthly allowances.  Figure 1 shows how this equation is delicately 
balanced.  Asset Allocation and Actuarial Assumptions are the two components of the Asset 
Liability Management that form the base of the equation.  The asset allocation of the investments 
and the assumptions used to fund the DB plan are critical to ensuring there will be enough funds 
available to pay for future benefits.  Over the last 20 years, the majority of every dollar spent on 
CalPERS pensions came from investments (65 cents), followed by employer contributions (22 
cents) and then employee contributions (13 cents) (CalPERS, 2016a). 
The employee contributes a fixed percentage of his earnings towards the PBO as does his 
employer, who is responsible for paying the Actuarially Determined Employer Contribution 
(Employer Contribution) which is a fixed percentage of the covered payroll (Kilgour, 2013).  
CalPERS has the authority to adjust the Employer Contribution as needed and to require 
employers to pay the full amount of the PBO (Kilgour, 2013).  The Employer Contribution is 
derived by first calculating the Present Value (PV) of the benefits accrued in a given year and the 
administrative costs (also known as the Normal Costs) (Kilgour, 2013).  The PV is the current 
worth of benefits payable in the future after applying a discount rate for the assumed interest rate 
and adjusting for the probability of its payment.  Combine the PV with the amortized payments 
to make up any Unfunded Liabilities.  The amortization is usually between 20 to 30 years 
(Munnel & Aubry, 2015).  The Employer Contribution continually changes based on the funded 
status of the PBO.  The Funded Status identifies the value of the assets that are available today to 
pay for the future benefits. 
One of the biggest challenges for the State, schools, and public agencies in CalPERS is to set 
aside enough money for the employer contribution for the pensions.  There will be a strain on 
local governments’ budgets and their ability to provide essential services.  According to John 
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Shirley, City Manager of Sacramento, “Our greatest challenge over the next 10 years is dealing 
with the $450 million unfunded liability for retired employee health care benefits while at the 
same time paying for ever-increasing pension costs imposed by CalPERS” (Spiegel and Hudson, 
2015, 3).  Four public agencies that contract with CalPERS (cities of Stockton, San Bernardino, 
and Vallejo, and town of Mammoth) have declared bankruptcy (CalPERS, 2015b).  Other local 
governments may be forced to cut services and lay off employees and/or collect higher taxes and 
fees to meet the pension obligations or to declare bankruptcy.   
Legislature Background  
CalPERS, established in 1932, initially had an investment policy that restricted investments to 
safe and stable bonds, but this changed in 1966 with the passage of Proposition 1.  Proposition 1 
gave approval for CalPERS and other California public pension systems to invest 25% of their 
assets in blue chip equities.  Proposition 84, enacted in 1984, gave approval for CalPERS to 
invest in anything prudent.  Proposition 162, also known as the California Pension Protection 
Act, made three changes to how the public retirement plans were managed, was enacted in 1992.  
This Proposition gave the retirement boards exclusive authority over the administration and 
investments of the public retirement systems; it specified that the highest priority of the board 
was providing benefits to members and their beneficiaries; and stated that the Legislature could 
not change the composition and terms of board membership unless approved by a majority 
popular vote.  The Proposition effectively shifted the power over the public retirement plans 
from elected officials and taxpayers to members of the boards.  Prior to Proposition 162, elected 
officials could redirect funds out of a public pension because there were no State or federal laws 
preventing this action, but  Proposition 162 put an end to this.  SB 400, a major retroactive state 
pension increase enacted in 1999, gave enhanced benefits to all State and School employees.  
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These legislative changes have created long lasting impacts on the financial health of the pension 
plan and are discussed further in the Literature Review section.  (Kilgour, 2014) 
California Rule  
The California Rule came about as the result of several judiciary decisions regarding public 
pensions.  This rule states that the pension benefits given to an employee on the date of hire are 
protected and public employers cannot change future pension benefits unless the disadvantage to 
the participant is offset with something else that is at least comparable as long as the employee is 
employed (Kilgour, 2014).  This rule makes it very difficult for the employer to implement cost 
savings measures such as changing the benefit formula or increasing the Employee 
Contributions.   
The 2013 Public Employee Pension Reform Act (AB 340) did reduce pension costs; 
however, most of the provisions of the Act applied only to employees hired after January 1, 2013 
due to the California Rule.  The benefit formula for non-safety employees was changed from 
2.5% at 55 years old to 2% at 62 years old, with a maximum of 2.5% at 65 years.  Three new DB 
formulas were created for new safety employees that either reduced the benefit factor and/or 
increased the age when the safety employees could retire.  In addition to other reforms, the final 
compensation is based on a three years average rather than the highest year average and new 
employees were required to pay half of the pension’s Normal Costs.  The 50-50 split of the 
Normal Cost is required for new employees hired by public agencies, California State 
University, and schools, as well as judicial and legislative employees. The reform did not require 
a Normal Cost split for most State workers, but did encourage this practice going forward. 
(CalPERS, 2012) 
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GASB 67/68 
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 67/68 statements significantly changed 
the financial reporting and accounting requirements for public pension plans and the plan 
sponsors beginning with the June 2014 reports.  Among other things, it required the use of the 
Individual Entry Age Normal Cost Method as the basis for financial reporting, the Net Pension 
Liability (NPL) replaced the Net Pension Obligation which is the Actuarial Accrued Liability 
(AAL) less Market Value of Assets (MVA, previously it was Actuarial Value of Assets (AVA)).  
The smoothing techniques that were used for calculating the AVA cannot be applied to calculate 
the MVA (Kilgour, 2013)    
  The new guidelines also changed how the discount rate is used to convert the PBO to 
the Present Value.  Public pension plans can continue to use the assumed Rate of Return on 
Investments (ROR) as the discount rate for the portion of the liability that is expected to be 
covered by the plan assets.  The stricter reporting requirements of GASB 67/68 applies to the 
retirement systems that project their plan to be insufficient to cover the benefit payments.  A 
much lower discount rate is used to calculate the present value of the liability that is unfunded.  
Using this blended rate increased the unfunded liability and presented a more realistic value of 
the funded status of the public pension in comparison to pre-GASB 67/68.  The lower discount 
rate would be equivalent to the riskless rate of borrowing high-quality municipal bonds to cover 
the Unfunded Liability.  GASB 67/68 also reduced the amortization periods from up to 30 years 
to a period based on the remaining service years of the participants, which is typically 10 to 12 
years (Kilgour, 2013).   
The combination of using the MVA for the NPL, using a blended rate, and shorter 
amortization periods will make the public pension plans appear in worse financial conditions 
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compared to pre-GASB 67/68.  In addition, for cost-sharing plans such as CalPERS, each 
participating employer must now report in their financial statements its proportionate share of the 
Unfunded Liability.  The financial picture will now be more accurate and it will be clear to the 
elected officials, trustees, plan administrators, stakeholders, and the public how much debt is 
owed and how it will influence the credit rating of these entities (Kilgour, 2013).         
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METHODOLOGY   
The research determined how CalPERS’ investment strategy benchmarked against three large 
public retirement systems in the United States that have a high funded ratio of assets to unfunded 
liabilities:  New York State and Local Employees Retirement System (NYSLRS), Teacher 
Retirement System of Texas (TRS), and Florida Retirement System (FRS).   The purpose of 
examining the data is to provide objective information to managers and other stakeholders that 
will improve the decision-making and performance, in addition to increasing the level of 
accountability (Wholey, Hatry, Newcomer, 2004).  Table 1 contains data for each of the public 
retirement systems based on the following questions:   
1. How many members and employers are in this public pension plan?  What is the ratio of 
actives to retirees/survivors/ beneficiaries? 
2. What is the governance structure of the board of trustees? 
3. What is the market value of the investments and is there an investment policy?  What are 
the laws and regulations governing the investments? 
4. What is the asset allocation, assumed Rate of Return on Investments, and the actual Rate 
of Return on Investments for a 1-year, 5-year, 10-year, 20-year, and 25-year? 
5. What is the Actuarial Value of the Assets, Actuarial Accrued Liability and the Unfunded 
Actuarial Accrued Liability?  What is the Funded Status? 
By comparing the four systems, significant observations were made so that CalPERS can be in a 
better position to achieve the sufficient investment returns necessary to ensure the payout of 
future benefits to its members at the appropriate cost to employers and employees. 
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As described in Theodore H. Poister (2008), Measuring performance in public and nonprofit 
organizations, the research included the following steps:   
1. Identify measures to be used 
2. Develop precise definitions of the measures 
3. Collect the data from the public pension plans 
4. Use the data to assess the various public pension plans    
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LITERATIVE REVIEW  
Milliman 2015 Public Pension Funding Study 
The Milliman 2015 Public Pension Funding Study reviewed the funded status of the 100 largest 
U.S. public pension plans.  The various plan sponsors’ assessments of the funded status were 
included in the report along with Milliman’s own evaluation of the assumed ROR.  The assumed 
ROR was recalibrated and this resulted in a higher Accrued Liability and the Funded Status for 
the aggregate plans.  The median assumed ROR decreased from 8.00% in the 2012 study to 
7.75% in the 2013 and 2014 studies and then decreased slightly to 7.65% in the 2015 study.  The 
7.65% was 40 basis points higher than Milliman’s independently evaluated assumed ROR of 
7.25%.  Using the 7.25% assumed ROR rather than the median 7.65% caused the Accrued 
Liabilities to increase by $0.18 trillion, from the report of $4.08 trillion to $4.26 trillion.  The 
aggregate Accrued Liability reported of $4.08 trillion consisted of $1.67 trillion Accrued 
Liability from the 12.5 million active plan members and $2.41 trillion Accrued Liability from the 
12.6 million members that had not started to collect their pension. (Sielman, 2015)   
The plan sponsors reported the Market Value of the Assets at $3.06 trillion; therefore, the 
Unfunded Accrued Liability was $1.20 trillion, compared to the sponsors’ reported $1.02 trillion.  
The Funded Ratio of the Market Value of Assets, after using the recalibrated assumed ROR, 
decreased the 75.0% reported by the plan sponsors to 71.7%.  A comparison of the 2014 
recalibrated figure to the 2015 recalibrated figure for this valuation showed an overall increase 
from 68.2% to 71.7%.  The Funded Ratio based on the Actuarial Value of the Assets and the 
recalibrated assumed ROR decreased from the plan sponsors’ reported 72% to 68.9%.  
Furthermore, there was also a decrease from 69.4% to 68.9% based on the recalibrated figure 
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from last year.  For the first time, the number of retired and inactive members was larger than the 
number of active members for the 100 public pension plans.  A reduction on the assumed ROR 
of 100 basis points causes a 12% to 13% increase in the Accrued Liability, which causes a 
decrease in the funded status of the public pension plan.  In addition, the asset allocations were 
70% in non-fixed income and 30% in fixed income. (Sielman, 2015)  
Increased Pension Costs  
The current state of CalPERS’s Unfunded Liability can be attributed to increased pension costs 
from: 1) employers not paying the full amount of the Actuarially Required Contribution; 2) 
aggressive investment strategies; 3) enhanced benefits and higher compensation; and 4) 
divestment activities.  
Funding Holidays 
In the 1990s, when more investments were shifted from bonds to equities, the rate of returns 
were double-digits and resulted in more than doubling the assets per worker (Pew Charitable 
Trusts & Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2014).  This was during the dot-com boom and it 
seemed as though the high returns would continue indefinitely.  Half of the states had reached 
100% funding of their public pension plans by 2000 (Pew Center on the States, 2010).  
CalPERS’s investments performed very well during this period; the plan was 101% funded in 
1995 and rose to a high of 137.9%.  A “funding holiday” was enjoyed by some employers, which 
translated into little or no payments made for the employer contributions.  For example, the 
employer contributions for CalPERS’s State plans was $1.2 billion in 1997-1998 (Funded Ratio 
133.9%) and decreased to a low of $156.7 million made by employer contributions in 2000-2001 
(Funded Ratio 104.6%).  The employer contribution rate increased to $677 million in 2001-2002 
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(Funded Ratio 86.9%) and then climbed to $1.2 billion in 2002-2003 (Funded Ratio 79.8%).  By 
2006-2007, the Funded Ratio was 101.2% and would rise and fall between then and today.  The 
employer contributions for CalPERS’s State plans has pretty much increased every year 
beginning in 2000-2001 until today.  (M. Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015).  
Not paying the full amount of the Actuarially Determined Contribution had unwanted 
consequences for the financial health of the pension system. Michael Travaglini, executive 
director of the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, stated “you need 
to make contributions in all market environments” (Pew Center on States, 2010, 24).  
Policymakers must  be disciplined and continue making the employer contribution even during 
periods of strong returns because the stock market is volatile and unpredictable, and eventually 
the day will come when there is another significant market loss.   
Enhanced Benefits and Salaries Raises 
SB 400, a major retroactive state pension increase enacted in 1999, gave enhanced benefits to all 
State and School employees in CalPERS.  CalPERS’ pension costs increased when the DB 
formula for CHP changed from 2% at 50 years old to 3% at 50 at years old and retirees received 
pension increases of 1% to 6% depending on when the person retired (Mendell, 2015c).  In 
addition, local police were also authorized 3% at 50  years old as part of this bill (Mendell, 
2015c).  SB 400 was “an opportunity to restore equity among CalPERS members without costing 
a dime of additional taxpayer money” said William Crist, the CalPERS board president at the 
time.  SB 400 increased the base of the pension obligation without much consideration of the 
long-term impacts of the change (Mendell, 2015d).   
Generous increases in the payroll also resulted in higher pension obligations.  Between 
1999 and 2009, the number of state employees increased by 39% and the average pay for state 
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workers increased by 50%;  local government workers increased by 60%, and local safety 
workers  increased by 69% (Little Hoover Commission, 2011).  Benefit enhancements can affect 
the pension obligation in the long term and should be carefully considered before the changes are 
made.   
A Shift to Aggressive Investment Strategies  
Although public pension 
plans are funded by 
employers’ and employees’ 
contributions, investment 
earnings are supposed to pay 
60% of the benefits (Pew 
Charitable Trusts & Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation, 2014).  As shown in Figure 2, over the past 30 years, public pension 
plans shifted their investments from fixed income investments - such as government and 
corporate bonds - to riskier investments (Pew Charitable Trusts & Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, 2014).  Beginning in the 1980s, investments shifted to equities and in the last decade 
alternative investments, such as private equities, hedge funds, real estate and commodities, 
became a large percentage of the portfolio for the public pension plans (Pew Charitable Trusts & 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2014).  There is a high level of risk with the equities and 
alternative investments because there is small probability of earning extremely high RORs; 
however, there is a very high probability of relatively low or even negative returns since 
investments are volatile and the investment loss can be significant.  In addition, pension funds 
Figure 2 State public pension investment shift over 30 years.   
The Pew Charitable Trusts and Laura and John Arnold Foundation. (2014). State public 
pension investment shift over 30 years.   
Public Pension Investments, 1952-2012 
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are exposed to market risks and there is only a 5% chance that the pension will have enough 
investment income to meet the needs of the retirees 15 years later (Novy-Marx, R., & Rauh, J. 
D., 2009).   
The stock market has fluctuated over the last ten years as evidenced by the wide range of 
the ROR.  The low end of the range was a 23.6% loss in 2009 and the high end was a 20.7% gain 
in 2011 followed by a 1% gain in 2012.  Even with six out of the last ten years being double-
digit gains, the ROR for CalPERS over a 10-year period was only 6.2%.  The 23.6% loss in 2009 
had a significant impact on CalPERS’ investments and the assets dropped from $251.2 billion in 
2007 to $178.9 billion.  Put differently, the Funded Status dropped from 101.2% as of June 30, 
2007 to 60.8% in 2009, and the impact could have been much worse had CalPERS not been 
nearly fully funded (Mendell, 2014) (M. Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015).  
By 2014, the MVA had almost doubled since 2009, yet CalPERS’s investments had only 
increased by 68% and had not fully recovered from the Great Recession despite a major bull 
market (Mendell, 2015a).  There are investment losses to the pension as the gap between the 
actual ROR and the assumed ROR widens.  This funding gap is reduced by collecting more 
revenue through contribution increases unless the investments outperform the assumed ROR in 
the ensuing years.   
Divestment Activities 
Through the years, CalPERS divested its investments based on political motivations, moral 
benefits, health, and social goals.  Wilshire estimated that the present value of historical 
exclusions to-date due to CalPERS’s divestment activities ranged from a loss of $3.79 billion to 
$8.32 billion.  A 1987 law during the Apartheid era required divestment of South African 
investments, which cost CalPERS an estimated $590 million in 1989.  If CalPERS had held onto 
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that investment, it would have grown to be somewhere between $1.1 billion to $4.27 billion in 
2014.  Divestments of tobacco-related securities, certain Emerging Markets (permissible 
countries and principles), companies on the Iran and Sudan lists, and certain firearm-related 
companies also caused CalPERS to lose billions of dollars.  (Wilshire, 2015)         
 In October 2015, Governor Brown signed into law Senate Bill 185 the Public Divestiture 
of Thermal Coal Companies Act.  Though the California Pension Protection Act gave 
CalPERS’s Board of Administration exclusive authority over the investments of the public 
retirement systems, the Legislature can prohibit certain investments by retirement boards for the 
social good.  The bill states that CalPERS and CalSTRS are required to constructively engage 
with the publicly traded coal companies in its portfolio to establish whether the coal companies 
are transitioning their business models to produce clean energy.  CalPERS and CalSTRS boards 
would then determine if they would divest its investments.  The retirement boards could choose 
not to divest its investments if doing otherwise is not consistent with the retirement board’s 
fiduciary responsibilities (Calpers, 2015c).  According to the California Watchdog.org, “… the 
industry [coal] is going through its worst slump in decades and coal companies’ market values 
have dropped nearly 90% since 2011” (Nikolewski, 2015).  Though CalPERS has a mere 0.03% 
or $83 million of its portfolio in coal companies, divesting its investment would mean a financial 
loss (Nikolewski, 2015).  Wilshire stated that the generally accepted academic argument 
regarding limiting investments had a “deleterious impact on performance over long periods of 
time” (Wilshire, 2015).         
Unfunded Status of the Plan  
Since governments are not required to fully fund public pension plans, there is the danger that 
the government has taken on more risk than prudent and this could lead to insolvency or 
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bankruptcy.  In the private sector, all current and future liabilities must be funded (1974 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act).  As of the June 30, 2001 valuation date, the Funded 
Status of CalPERS was 104.6%.  Since then, it has been slowly decreasing and reached a low of 
60.8% in 2009 and then climbed to an estimated 73.3% as of June 30, 2015 valuation (M. 
Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015).  The average Funded Rate over this 13-
year period was 82.2%.   
The Funded Status of CalPERS was estimated to be 73.3% which is a 3% decrease from 
the previous year’s 76.3% due to the actual ROR of 2.4% in 2015.  The actual ROR was 5% 
lower than the assumed ROR of 7.5% (Borenstein, 2015).  Since investment earnings are not 
performing at the projected level, this gap must be made up by collecting more revenue through 
the increase of the employer contributions and the employee contributions, albeit the latter is 
from a limited pool of new employees.  Chief Investment Officer Ted Eliopoulos warns that if 
the funded status falls below 50%, this would be “a difficult place to climb out if we get there.” 
(Borenstein, 2015).  CalPERS staff projects that there is a 28% to 35% chance of falling below 
the 50% funded status level within the next 30 years (CalPERS, 2015b).   
Underfunding affects the financial outlook for an agency and more scrutiny is now given 
by the bond rating agencies.  Bond rating agencies look at the Unfunded Liabilities associated 
with the retirement benefits to determine creditworthiness and financial stability for an agency.  
The higher the credit rating, the less an agency pays to borrow money.  In 2011, rating agency 
Moody’s Investor Service added pension underfunding to an entity’s general indebtedness and 
applied a 5.5% discount rate rather than the typical 8% (Kilgour, 2013).  Prior to this, Moody’s 
used the discount rate reported in the pension plans.  Moody’s also changed its methodology and 
now uses the MVA and amortizations over 17 years.  Previously Moody’s used the AVA and 
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amortizations over 30 years to calculate the pension’s Funded Status (Kilgour, 2013).  Moody’s 
new methodology increased the total pension underfunding from $766 billion to $2.2 trillion and 
thus with the revised Unfunded Liability, the employer contributions increased from 2.6% of 
revenue to 9.1% (Kilgour, 2013).   
The Stability of the Public Pension Plans Continue to be Threatened 
A negative cash flow occurs when the payout for the monthly DB allowance is more than the 
contributions from employees and employers, and the investments are liquidated to bridge the 
gap.  In 2013-2014, a total of $17.8 billion was paid from CalPERS to retirees.  A negative cash 
flow of $5.2 billion resulted when only $12.6 billion was collected from employees ($3.8 billion) 
and employers ($8.8 billion) (Petersen, 2015a).  Clearly the revenue coming into the fund is not 
enough to pay for all the expenses, and the cash flow will only get worse when and if the 
following occurs: the next wave of baby boomers retire, the retirees are projected to live longer 
or the number of retirees become larger than the active members that are making contributions 
into the plan.  CalPERS is expected to have negative cash flows over the next fifteen years unless 
there are significant increases in the contributions or the ROR is higher than projected (Lamont, 
2015).   
In 2013 there were 28,588 
retirees compared to 13,780 
retirees in 1999 (CalPERS, 
2014a).  The ratio of active 
employees to retirees has been 
steadily declining and a         Figure 3 Ratio of Actives to Retirees 
        Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30, 2014.   
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significant number of baby boomers is expected to retire in the near term.  The ratio of workers 
to retirees was 2.04 in 2001, and now the ratio 
was 1.3 of workers to retirees in 2014 (Figure 
3).   
This ratio is forecasted to be less than 1 by 
2025 and continue to be in the range of 0.6 
and 0.8 past 2059 (Figure 4).  For a mature 
plan, if the assumed ROR is not achieved, this 
will likely cause large swings in the contribution rate since there are not enough active members 
contributing in the plan to stabilize the rates and this could lead to insolvency or bankruptcy.  
Normally a retirement plan with a mature plan would “derisk” (move risky investments into safer 
ones to reduce risk) (Borenstein, 2015).  However, CalPERS still has the majority of its assets 
allocated to Equity which leaves the employers and its members vulnerable to another financial 
collapse.  (CalPERS, 2015b) 
Ideally, CalPERS should escalate the employer contributions which would increase the 
funded status and reduce the risk of the plan.  However, employer contribution levels now are at 
the highest point and are expected to climb higher still and remain at that level until 2026-2027 
and then gradually fall back to the 2014-2015 level almost 20 years later (Mendell, 2014).  
According to CalPERS’ State Actuarial Valuation (CalPERS, 2014b), the Employer 
Contributions is expected to increase by $487.2 million, from $4.3 billion to $4.8 billion, 
between 2014-2015 and 2015-2016.  This difference was largely due to new demographic 
actuarial assumptions approved in 2014, increases in payroll (salary increases and new 
employees), and changes to the amortization and smoothing policy.     The projected employer  
   
 Figure 4 Forecasted Ratio of Actives to Retirees 
 Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30, 
2014.   
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contribution rate over the next five years will continue to climb as shown in Figure 5, assuming a 
7.5% rate of return, all actuarial assumptions are realized, and there are no further changes to the 
assumptions, contributions, and benefits of the plan.  There are 62 safety plans and eight 
miscellaneous plans that have rates above 50% of payroll (Mendell,  2014). 
 
 
  
   Figure 5 Projected Future Contribution Rates 
   Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30, 2014.    
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FINDINGS 
Membership 
CalPERS had a total of 1.8 million members, comprised of the non-teaching school employees, 
State employees, and employees of local governments.  There were 3,007 employers 
participating in the plan as of June 30, 2015.  There were 1.3 workers to every retirees, with 
868,713 active members compared to 611,078 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries.  All current 
employees contributing a portion of their paycheck towards the pension are considered active 
employees.  Inactive members that are vested but not currently receiving benefits or non-vested 
members not considered “active” and were excluded from the ratio. (CalPERS, 2016a).   
The Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS) had a total of 1.5 million members.  The 
membership includes employees and retirees of state-supported educational institutions in Texas, 
with 1,347 employers participating in the plan.  The ratio of actives to retirees was 2.2 with close 
to 828,851 active members compared to 377,738 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries 2.  (TRS, 
2015)  
 The Florida State Retirement System (FRS) had 1.0 million members.  There were 1,016 
employers in the retirement system which included all state, county, district school board, state 
college, and state university employers with optional participation of cities, charter schools, 
metropolitan planning districts, and special districts in Florida.  The ratio of workers to retiree, 
survivors, and beneficiaries was 1.5 (626,578 active members compared to 428,685 retirees, 
survivors, and beneficiaries).   (FRS, 2015a) 
28 | P a g e  
 
    The New York State and Local Retirement Systems (NYSLRS) is comprised of two 
different systems administered by the same staff.  They are the Employees’ Retirement System 
(ERS) and Police and Fire Retirement System (PFRS).  The members of ERS work for public 
employers in non-teaching positions and include uniformed services personnel, such as 
correction officers and sheriffs.  Police officers and firefighters make up the membership of 
PFRS.  Both the ERS and the PFRS do not include any public employers in New York City as 
New York City has its own retirement system.  There were 1.1 million members in NYSLRS, of 
which approximately 1.0 million were in ERS and 68,000 were in PFRS.  The number of 
employers in NYSLRS was 3,032 and the ratio of active members to retirees was 1.2 with 
522,927 active members and 430,308 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries. (NYSLRS, 2015a)       
The Governance Structure of the Boards of Trustees of the Public Pension Systems 
The trustees of CalPERS, Teacher Retirement System of Texas, Florida State Retirement System 
and New York State and Local Retirement System have similar responsibilities for the respective 
pension system such as setting employer contribution rates, authority and responsibility for the 
investment of assets, and completing actuarial valuations.  The Board of Administration for 
CalPERS consists of 13 members who are elected, appointed, or hold office ex officio.  Each 
board member is elected for a four-year term.  Two board members were Governor Appointees, 
four members were ex officio (State Treasurer, State Controller, Director of the California 
Department of Human Resources, and a designee of the State Personnel Board Representative), 
one member was appointed jointly by the Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the 
Assembly, and the remaining six members were elected by active and retired state and local 
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government workers.  The Chief Executive Officer is in charge of administering the directions 
set by the board and the day-to-day operations.  (CalPERS, 2015a) 
The Teacher Retirement System of Texas has a nine-member board of trustees with three 
trustees directly appointed by the Governor and the remaining trustees are appointed by the 
Governor from lists generated by specific groups.  They serve six-year terms.  The 
administration of the plan is led by the Executive Director.  (TRS, 2015)      
The number of trustees is much smaller for the Florida State Retirement System and the 
New York State and Local Retirement Systems.  The members of these boards are all elected 
officials and serving as trustees is part of their job responsibilties.  The trustees of the Florida 
State Board of Administration consist of the Governor as Chairman, the Chief Financial Officer, 
and the Attorney General.  The Governor appoints the Secretary of the Department of 
Management Services who appoints the State Retirement Director who manages FRS (FRS, 
2015a).  The New York State Comptroller is the sole trustee of the New York State and Local 
Retirement Systems.  He is responsible for the investment of the assets and leads the 
administration of the system (NYSLRS, 2015a). 
Investment Guidelines 
The CalPERS Public Employees’ Retirement Fund has a market value of $301.1 billion as of 
June 30, 2015.  CalPERS Total Fund Investment Policy sets forth the investment beliefs and 
objectives for its investment program.  CalPERS Investment Policy identifies the objectives and 
policies of the investment program.  The overall objective of the investment program is to 
generate returns at the appropriate risk levels to provide benefits to members and their 
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beneficiaries over a long-term and according to the law.  Specifically, the performance objectives 
are 1) achieve a long-term rate of return that meets or exceeds the actuarial rate of return; 2) 
maximize the returns for the level of risk taken; 3) achieve a return that exceeds the Policy index; 
and 4) invest assets efficiently and effectively.   The California Constitution, Article XVI, 
section 17 gives the CalPERS Board the sole fiduciary responsibility over the assets and the 
administration of the retirement system.  The strategic objectives, specific investment policies, 
performance goals and benchmarks, restrictions and responsibilities outlined in the policy are 
intended to provide the framework for the management of the assets and enable transparency and 
compliance.  The Asset Class Allocation section sets the targets and ranges for specific types of 
investments.  Benchmarks are specified for the various asset classes to see if the investment 
strategy is meeting or exceeding the goal.  The Investment Risk Management section strives to 
find the balance between risk and return, with a large, diversified pool of asset classes (CalPERS, 
2016c).            
The Teacher Retirement System of Texas’s Pension Trust Fund had a market value of 
$127.93 billion as of August 31, 2015.  The Investment Policy Statement was similar to 
CalPERS.  The statement defines the roles and responsibilities of the Board, Investment 
Division, consultants and advisors.  The investment program is structured and managed to 
achieve the following objectives 1) control risk through diversification of asset classes and 
establishing long-term return expectations and risk; and 2) achieve a long-term rate of return that 
exceeds the a) assumed actuarial rate of return adopted by the Board; b) long-term rate of 
inflation by an annualized 5%; and c) return of a composite benchmark of the respective long-
term normal asset mix.  The retirement plan operates under the provisions of the Texas 
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Constitution, Article XVI, Section 67 and Texas Government Code, Title 8, Subtitle C.   (TRS, 
2014) 
The Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan Trust Fund had a market value of 
$147.97 billion as of June 30, 2015.  The Defined Benefit Plan Investment Policy Statement’s 
investment objectives are to provide investment returns sufficient for the plan that ensures timely 
payment of benefits to current and future participants and keeps the plan at a reasonable cost.  
The long-term investment objective is to earn a compounded return of 5% plus the rate of 
inflation per annum over the long run,  This was achieved over 20-, 25- and 30-year periods but 
not over a 10- or 15-year period.  The plan adheres to statutory guidelines mandated by the 
Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes Section 215.47. (FRS, 2014). 
The New York State Common Retirement Fund in the New York State and Local 
Retirement Systems had a market value of $184.50 billion as of March 31, 2015.  The General 
Investment Policies provides the framework for a well diversified investment program.  The 
investment income, along with employer and employee contributions, should be sufficient to 
fund the current and future benefits of the retirement plan’s participants as they become due.  
The Comptroller is bound by provisions set out in the Retirement and Social Security Law 
(RSSL), Regulations of the New York State Department of Financial Services, and State 
Banking Law.  The “legal list”, found in the RSSL and Banking Law, sets limitations on the 
quantity and quality of investments that may be held in certain asset classes and the “basket 
clause” of the RSSL allows up to 25% of the assets to be invested in areas specifically not 
authorized by other statues.  (NYSLRS, 2015b)        
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Asset Allocations and the Return on Investments  
According to CalPERS, the market value of the assets in the Public Employees’ Retirement Fund 
(PERF) as of June 30, 2015 was $301.1 billion, with  53.8% of the current allocation in Global 
Equity ($162.0 billion), 9.6% in Private Equity ($28.9 billion), 17.6%  in Global Fixed Income 
($53.0 billion), 10.5% in Real 
Assets ($31.6 billion), 2.5% in 
Liquidity ($7.5 billion), 5.2% in 
Inflation Sensitive Assets ($15.7 
billion), and 0.4% in Absolute 
Return Strategy ($1.2 billion), and 
0.4% in Total Plan Level (Figure 6).   
In 2015, the 1-year ROR was 2.4%, 
for the 5-year period it was 10.7%, and for the 10-year period, which included the Great 
Recession, it was 6.2%.  The ROR for the 20-year period was 7.76%. The long-term assumed 
ROR for CalPERS’s was 7.5%.  (CalPERS, 2015a). 
According to the Teacher 
Retirement System of Texas 2015 
Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report (2015), the market value of the 
assets in the Pension Trust Fund as of 
August 31, 2015 was $127.9 billion, 
with 62.7% of the current allocation in 
53.8% 
9.6% 
17.6% 
10.5% 
2.5% 
5.2% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
CalPERS Asset Allocations  
as of June 30, 2015 
Global Equity 
Private Equity 
Global Fixed 
Income 
Real Assets 
Liquidity 
Inflation Assets 
Absolute Return 
Strategies 
Total Plan Level 
Figure 6 CalPERS Asset Allocations  
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report. 
 
62.7% 
15.8% 
19.4% 
2.1% 
Teacher Retirement System of Texas Asset 
Allocations  
as of August 31, 2015 
Global Equity 
Stable Value 
Real Return 
Risk Parity 
Figure 7 Teacher Retirement System of Texas Asset Allocations  
Source: Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual 
financial report.   
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Global Equity ($80.2 billion), 15.8% in Stable Value ($20.2 billion), 19.4% in Real Return 
($24.8 billion), and 2.1% in Risk Parity ($2.7 billion) (Figure 7).  In 2015, the 1-year was -0.3%, 
the 5-year period it was 9.6%, and the 10-year period was 6.2%.    The long-term assumed ROR 
for the fund was 8% (TRS, 2015).   
 The Florida Retirement System Pension Plan had a market value of $147.97 billion as of 
June 30, 2015.  Approximately 
58.1% of the asset allocation was in 
Global Equity ($86.00 billion), 6% 
was in Private Equity ($8.9 billion), 
19.8% in Global Fixed Income 
($29.3 billion), 8.3% in Real Estate 
($12.3 billion), 6.9% in Strategic 
Investments ($10.2 billion), and 
0.8% in Cash and Short Term 
Securities ($1.2 billion)(Figure 8).  
The 1-year ROR was 3.7%, for the 5-year period it was 11.0%, for the 10-year period was 6.6%, 
and for the 20-year period it was 8.1%.  The long-term assumed ROR for the fund was 7.65% 
(FRS, 2015b).   
The New York State and Local Retirement System had a market value of $184.5 billion 
as of March 31, 2015.  Approximately 39.5% of the asset allocation was in Domestic Equity 
($72.9 billion), 13.7% was in International Equity ($25.3 billion), 7.5% in Private Equity ($13.8 
billion), 21.4% in Global Fixed Income ($39.5 billion), 6.4% in Real Estate ($11.9 billion), 3.5% 
58.1% 
6.0% 
19.8% 
8.3% 
6.9% 
0.8% 
Florida Retirement System Asset Allocations  
as of June 30, 2015 
Global Equity 
Private Equity 
Global Fixed Income 
Real Estate 
Strategic 
Investments 
Cash/Short Term 
Securities 
Figure 8 Florida Retirement System Asset Allocations  
Source: Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and 
other state administered systems comprehensive annual financial report fiscal year ended 
june 30, 2015. 
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in Absolute Return Strategy ($6.5 billion), 0.7% in Opportunistic Funds ($1.3 billion), 1.9% in 
Cash ($3.5 billion), 0.2% in Real Assets ($369,000), and 5.2% in Inflation Indexed Bonds ($9.6 
billion) (Figure 9).  The 1-
year ROR was 7.16%, for 
the 5-year period it was 
10.2%, for the 10-year 
period it was 7.1%, for the 
20-year period it was 8.7%, 
and for the 25-year period it 
was 9.0%.  The long-term 
assumed ROR for the fund 
was 7.0% (NYSLRS, 
2015a). 
Actuarial Information 
The MVA is based on the stock market price on a given day if the investments were sold.  When 
an Actuary uses the MVA to determine the amount Plan Administrators need to set aside to pay 
future retirees, the amount may vary greatly from year to year as the stock market fluctuates 
from year to year and this cost would be difficult to budget.  Therefore, the actuary uses the 
AVA, which is an average value of the assets over a period.  The AVA is important in 
determining whether the plan will meet its future Net Pension Liability. Actuarial valuation 
methods and assumptions, chosen by the Trustees, are used to smooth out the effects of the short-
term volatility in the market value of assets.  The AVA tends to lag behind the markets and can 
39.5% 
13.7% 
7.5% 
21.4% 
6.4% 
3.5% 
0.7% 
1.9% 
0.2% 5.2% 
New York State and Local Retirement System Asset 
Allocations  
as of March 31, 2015 
Domestic Equity 
Int'l Equity 
Private Equity 
Global Fixed Income (Bond, Cash and 
Mortgages) 
Real Estate 
Absolute Return Strategy 
Opportunistic Funds 
Cash   
Real Assets 
Inflation Indexed Bonds 
Figure 9 New York State and Local Retirement System Asset Allocations  
Source: New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a).  2015 comprehensive annual financial 
report. 
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be different from the MVA when there are large market movements.  The ratio of AVA to MVA 
measures the extent to which the public pension plans have experienced overall market gains or 
losses over time.  If the ratio is over 100%, the market has experienced more losses than gains; 
whereas if the ratio is under 100%, it means there have been more gains than losses.  (Sielman, 
2015) 
 The Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) represents the portion of the present value of 
fully projected benefits of service credits earned as of the valuation date.  The Unfunded 
Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL) is the excess, if any, of the Actuarial Accrued Liability less 
the Actuarial Value of Assets.  The UAAL represents the PV of the benefits earned that are not 
covered by the current plan assets.  The Funded Ratio refers to the percentage of the current plan 
assets that would cover the future pension benefits.  The ratio is calculated by diving the AVA by 
the AAL (Sielman, 2015).        
The CalPERS’ AVA was $301.3 billion and the AAL was $394.7 billion as of June 30, 
2014 valuation.  During that same period, the UAAL was $93.5 billion and the Funded Ratio for 
the plan was 76.3% (CalPERS, 2015a).   
The AVA for the Teacher Retirement System of Texas was $133.5 billion and the AAL 
was $166.5 billion.  The UAAL was $33.0 billion and the Funded Ratio for the plan was 80.2%.   
The actuarial funding method is the Individual Entry Age Normal Cost Method.  (Gabriel Roeder 
Smith & Company, 2015)  
The AVA for the Florida Retirement System was $143.2 billion and the AAL was $165.5 
billion.  The UAAL was $22.3 billion and the Funded Ratio for the plan was 86.5%.  If the 
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pension plan had adhered to the financial reporting requirements established by GASB and used 
the MVA and the Individual Entry Age Normal for its calculations, the Unfunded Liability 
would have been much lower ($12.9 billion compared to $22.3 billion).  The actuarial funding 
method used for the calculation was the Ultimate Entry Age Normal Cost Method. (FRS, 2015a) 
The AVA for the New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System was $184.2 billion 
and the AAL was $196.5 billion.  The UAAL was $12.4 billion and the Funded Ratio for the 
plan was 93.7% (Dutcher, 2015).  
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ANALYSIS 
Membership – Three of the Four Pension Plans are Nearing Maturity Levels  
All four public pension plans had over one million members and were multi-employer pension 
plans.  CalPERS by far had the most members and employers with 1.8 million members and 
3,007 employers followed closely by TRS (1.5 million members, 1,347 employers), NYSLRS 
(1.07 million, 3,032 employers), and then FRS (1.03 million, 1,016 employers).  The ratio of the 
total number of active employees to the total number of retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries 
showed that NYSLR has the lowest ratio of 1.2 followed closely by the 1.3 ratio for CalPERS 
and 1.5 ratio for FRS.  A ratio at or below ones indicates a more mature plan.  Not only is the 
public pension plan responsible for paying benefits to a higher number of retirees, the number of 
active members making contributions is smaller.  The monthly allowances to the retirees are 
funded by employer and employee contributions and earnings from investments.  If the actual 
ROR is lower than the assumed ROR, this gap must be made up by higher contributions from 
employers and employees.  Higher employer contribution rates could lead to service level cuts 
for the public agency or even bankruptcy.  The negative impact increases further if the financial 
market collapses and the investments were not diversified.  It is expected that with the pending 
retirement of the baby boomers, this ratio will only get smaller unless there are significant 
increases in the number of new members entering the pension plan.   However, due to retirement 
reforms such as the 2013 Public Employee Pension Reform Act, new members will most likely 
be hired in at a lower benefit level.  This lower benefit tier will have little to no Unfunded 
Liabilities so the contribution rates will be low or the new member may be enrolled in a Defined 
Contribution Plan.  The savings realized by the employer due to the lower contribution rates is 
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required to be to be allocated to the Unfunded Liability, subject to the appropriation in the annual 
budget (CalPERS, 2016d).  TRS had more than double the number of active members compared 
to retirees, beneficiaries, and survivors which indicated the pension plan is not reaching a 
maturity level.   
It is not surprising that three out of the four public pension plans are nearing maturity 
levels since their assets are by far much larger than the other 96 public pension plans included in 
the Milliman 2015 Annual Study on Public Pension Funding (Sielman, 2015).  The MVA for 
each of the four public pension plans was over $100 million and the number of active members 
exceeded 400,000.  There were no other public pension plans that met either of these two criteria 
with the exception of CalSTRS which met both criteria.  However, CalSTRS Funded Status was 
below 70% in 2015 and therefore not benchmarked in this research (CalSTRS, 2015). 
Governance Structure – Appointed Versus Elected and Term Limits 
Both FRS and NYSLRS had only elected officials that served as trustees of their boards.  This is 
different from CalPERS and TRS where the Governor appointed directly or indirectly the 
majority of the board members.  The board members would be held accountable by its members 
if the position was elected rather than appointed.  If the board member is not doing a good job, 
the person would not be re-elected.  The process is more democratic if the membership decides 
who will represent them.  The majority of the board members are stakeholders that currently 
receive or will receive a pension upon retirement.  It would seem that the interest of the pension 
plan’s membership is best served when the board members are elected by membership rather 
than appointed by the Governor.  However, appointed board members may have some 
advantages too.  Perhaps the appointed board member will be more concerned with long-term 
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sustainability of the public pension plan if this person does not have to be concerned with getting 
re-elected and doing what the people currently want.  The hybrid governance structure that 
CalPERS has is more tipped to the politicians since only six out of the 13 board members are 
elected by the membership and the rest are appointed.  Adding board members who have the 
financial expertise, are not stakeholders nor appointed is something that could be explored in 
future research.   
The CalPERS’ board members serve for a four-year term with no term limits.  There are 
also no term limits for the President or committee chairs.  The President and Vice President are 
elected annually for a one-year term and the current President, Rob Feckner, has been elected for 
12 consecutive years as the President.  In 2016, CalPERS’ governance committee sought to 
change the term limits and it was Rob Feckner’s vote that became the deciding vote when he 
voted against term limits (Mendell, 2016). Term limits is another area that should be explored in 
future research.  
Guidelines for Investment Vary Significantly Among Pension Plans 
CalPERS Investment Policy, which is 62 pages long, was comprehensive and clearly 
documented the objectives and policies for its investment program.  CalPERS was the only 
pension plan that adopted ten Investment Beliefs which provides a framework for the strategic 
management of the investment portfolios and provides context of the organizational priorities.   
It was the only guideline that described in detail the frequency and types of report that the 
Investment Office staff, General Pension Consultants, and the Private Asset Class Board 
Investment Consultants must provide.  For example, the Investment Office staff must report the 
asset class allocations relative to their target and ranges, as well as investment performance 
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returns and any deviations from the policy range at the next Committee meeting or sooner if 
deemed necessary.  Therefore, on a monthly basis the Investment Committee receives a report 
from the Investment Office staff about asset allocation, risk, and investment performance.  These 
updates are important and will help the trustees perform their fiduciary duties.  CalPERS also 
listed in detail the investment responsibilities and expectations for the Investment Committee, 
Investment Office staff, Actuarial Office staff, External Manager and consultants.   
TRS Policy Statement was contained in 46 pages and included information similar to 
CalPERS’ with less details.  NYSLRS and FRS had relatively short general guidelines, 16 pages 
and 9 pages respectively.  NYSLRS guidelines were unique in that there was a “legal list” which 
set limitations on the quality and quantity of investments in certain asset classes (mainly Fixed 
Income and Equity).  Additionally, a “basket clause” provides much flexibility for the 
investments since up to 25% of the assets could be invested in areas not specifically authorized 
by any other provision of law (e.g., alternative investments such as hedge funds, commodities, 
private equity and international bonds that are typically more risky than stocks and bonds and 
have higher fees).  The State Comptroller of New York must follow the “prudent person” and 
“exclusive benefit” fiduciary standards and there are policies and practices in place to ensure that 
the fund is managed to ethical standards and the actions are transparent.  Hence, NYSLRS 
guidelines included Ethical Standards whereas no other pension plans benchmarked did.   
There was a bill to increase the basket clause percentage from 25% to 30% to mitigate 
market volatility while maintaining high returns.  The N.Y. Legislature approved the bill in June 
2014; however, the Governor vetoed it (Steyer, 2014).   Increasing the percentage of investments 
allowed under the “basket clause” would have given the Comptroller too much flexibility and 
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further increased the risk for alternative investments that are typically more difficult to value and 
monitor.     
CALPERS’ Asset Allocations Today Are Similar to Its Asset Allocation Before the Stock 
Market Crash in 2008    
CalPERS holds close to 63% in Equity as of June 30, 2015 which was very similar to the 66% of 
the Equity investments held as of June 30, 2007.  In 2006-2007, the stock market had a strong 
performance and the ROR for Equity was 23.7% (2015 CAFR, 2015 and 2007 CAFR, 2007).  
Despite huge losses related to the subprime lending market in spring 2007, the stock market 
continued to climb and the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached a closing high in October 
2007.    Eventually the market began to plummet and by December 2007, the United States had 
fallen into a recession.  The market continued to decline until it reached a low in October 2008 
(Kosakowski, n.d.).  The 2008 CAFR reported that 61.7% of the asset allocations were in Equity 
as of June 30, 2008 and since there were significant losses in Global Equity, the ROR was a loss 
of 9% for this asset class (CalPERS, 2008).  The 2009 CAFR reflected the largest impact of the 
stock market crash of 2008 with a ROR in Equity of -28.6%, with 55.6% invested in this asset 
class (CalPERS, 2009).   According to one financial strategist, Albert Edwards, recent events 
make him believe that the “world is headed for a disaster, and will take the prices of equities 
down with it.” (Matthews, 2016) Edwards predicts the U.S. stock market will plunge as much as 
75%.  The stock market is cyclical and when the next stock market crash occurs, if CalPERS 
continues to have a majority of its investments in Equity, the MVA will decrease significantly 
during the next stock market crash and it will be very difficult for the public pension plan to 
rebound.   
42 | P a g e  
 
Categorizing the Risk of the Asset Allocations 
CalPERS’ Investment Committee attended the 2013 Asset Liabilities Management Workshop 
and reviewed the asset classes and risk factors framework (CalPERS, 2013).  The risk factors 
(low, moderate, and high) associated with the asset classes were used to categorize the 
investments of the four pension plans, resulting in an analysis that showed the overall risk of the 
public pension plans.  Over 93% of the asset classes owned by CalPERS, TRS, FRS and 
NYSLRS were categorized for the risk analysis.  A few of the asset classes were not included in 
the analysis because the risk associated with the particular asset class could not be easily defined 
unless more research was performed on the particular holdings in the asset class.  Total Plan 
Level, Risk Parity, Strategic Investments, and Opportunistic are examples of the asset classes 
excluded from the risk analysis as the investments could potentially be diversified among various 
asset classes.  Investments in equities (e.g., Global Equity, Private Equity, Domestic Equity) 
were considered high risk; Real Assets, Inflation Assets, Real Return, and Real Estate were 
considered moderate risk; and Global Fixed Income, Inflation Indexed Funds, Liquidity, 
Absolute Return Strategies, Stable Value, Cash/Short Term Securities were considered low risk. 
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Majority of Asset Allocation in High/Moderate Risk Categories 
  
High Moderate Low  % of Total 
Allocation 
CalPERS 63.40% 15.70% 20.5% 99.60% 
TRS 62.70% 19.41% 15.8% 97.88% 
FRS 64.16% 8.30% 20.6% 93.09% 
NYSLRS 60.70% 6.60% 28.5% 95.80% 
CalPERS had 79.1% of its assets allocation in high/moderate risk investments, with 63% 
invested in high risk (53.8% Global Equity and 9.6% Private Equity).  Approximately 20.9% of 
CalPERS’ assets were considered low risk.  In 2015, CalPERS’ assets had a very low ROR of 
2.4%. TRS had a similar allocation with 82.1% of the assets considered high/moderate risk, with 
62.7% invested in Global Equity (i.e., U.S., Non-U.S. Developed, Emerging Markets, 
Directional Hedge Funds, Public Equity, and Private Equity).  At most 16.0% of TRS’s assets 
were invested in what is considered low risk.  This strategy brought a loss of 0.3% over the one-
year period.   
In contrast, although NYSLRS had approximately the same percentage of high risk 
assets, the percentage of low risk investments was at least 28.5% of the portfolio.  With the 
exclusion of the Absolute Return Strategy, the 28.5% allocated in low risk was considerably 
higher than the other three public pension plans.  This strategy also provided the highest one-year 
ROR of the group at 7.2%.  Investing in Fixed Income, considered as low risk, is considered to 
be a sound investment strategy because it has historically been less volatile than equities, there is 
Table #1 Asset Allocations in Risk Categories and Percent of Total Allocation  
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report. 
             Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems  
             New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a).  2015 comprehensive annual financial report 
             Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.   
 
. 
 
 
 
comprehensive annual financial report fiscal year ended june 30, 2015. 
 
             Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.   
 
srouce 
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income generation, and it diversifies the assets allocation.  It was difficult to compare FRS to the 
other three public pension plans because of the inability to determine the risk level of the 
Strategic Investments.  This asset class is approximately 7% of the asset allocation and if it were 
considered moderate/high risk, then the asset allocation would be very similar to CalPERS with a 
79%/ 20% split.  If Strategic Investments was considered low risk, the makeup would be similar 
to NYSLRS with a 72%/ 27% split.   
Rate of Return on Investments are More Likely to Meet or Exceed the Assumed Rate in the 
Long Run  
  
Rate of Return on Investments   
Long Term 
Assumed 
Rate of 
Return 
  1 year 5-year 10-year 20-year 25-year 
 
  
CalPERS 2.4% 10.7% 6.2% 7.8% N/A 
 
7.5% 
TRS -0.3% 9.6% 6.2% 7.7% 8.7% 
 
8.0% 
FRS 3.7% 11.0% 6.9% 8.1% 8.7% 
 
7.7% 
NYSLRS 7.2% 10.2% 7.1% 8.7% 9.0%   7.5% 
        Table #2 Rate of Return on Investments 
 
The box is shaded if the Rate of Return exceeded the Assumed Rate of Return over a 10-year period 
 
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report. 
             Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems  
            New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a).  2015 comprehensive annual financial report 
            Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.   
 
Looking at the RoRs from a long-term perspective (i.e., 10+ years) revealed that none of the four 
public pension plans exceeded the long-term assumed ROR for the 10-year period.  The actual 
10-year ROR for the four pension plans ranged from 6.2% to 7.1%.   CalPERS and NYSLRS had 
the lowest assumed ROR among the group yet the assumed ROR was not low enough to be less 
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than or equal to the actual ROR over the 10-year period.  CalPERS, FRS, and NYSLRS both fell 
short of the assumed ROR (130 basis points, 80 basis points 30 basis points, respectively).  Over 
a 20 year period, CalPERS, FRS, and NYSLRS exceeded the assumed RoR over a 20-year 
period for and TRS, FRS and NYSLR exceeded the assumed ROR over a 25-year period.  
NYSLRS changed their long-term assumed ROR to 7.0% effective September 2015.  NYSLRS 
had the highest ROR over the 10-year period and now has the lowest assumed ROR.     
When the actual ROR varies from the assumed ROR, this causes more financial strain on 
the public pension plan.  For example, the CalPERS investments in 2015 should have earned 
$22.6 billion based on the assumed 7.5% return and the $301.1 billion MVA.  However, the 
actual return was 2.4%.  The difference between the assumed and actual ROR was approximately 
$16 billion or 5.3% of the MVA.  Therefore, if there were no smoothing efforts, in order to make 
up for the previous year’s losses, the target for the following year would be increased from 7.5% 
to 12.8% (Ring, E 2016).  This process of smoothing out market ups and downs, that is, using the 
investment gains/losses from a particular year to offset the investment gains/losses from a nearby 
year, ensure that the contribution rates don’t vary greatly from year to year if the actual ROR is 
not equal to the assumed ROR.  However, smoothing also makes it difficult to identify the 
financial position of the pension plan at a given point in time. 
A sensitivity analysis of the assumed ROR was performed on the State Miscellaneous 
Tier 1 in CalPERS.  The assumed ROR is currently at 7.5% and if this rate reduced by 1%, the 
Employer Contribution rate would increase from 25.1 % to 36.1% and the Funded Status would 
decrease from 72.0% to 64.5%.  If the assumed ROR increased by 1.0%, the Employer 
Contribution would decrease from 25.1% to 15.2% and the Funded Status would increase from 
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72.0% to 80.6%.  The 1.0% increase in the assumed ROR seems like a win-win for cash strapped 
agencies since the Funded Status increases and the contribution amount decreases.  However, if 
the actual ROR is less than the assumed ROR, the funding gap gets larger and larger and this 
could eventually lead to bankruptcy (CalPERS, 2014b).     
In 2015 CalPERS proposed to slowly shift risky investments into more conservative 
investments to increase the financial stability of the pension system (Mendell, 2015b).  By 
decreasing the assumed ROR from 7.5% to 6.5% over 20 to 30 years, some of the investments 
could be shifted to less risky ones.  This action would reduce the risk somewhat of another big 
loss when the next economic downturn occurs and reduce the risk of spikes in contribution rates.  
However, these lower assumed investment returns must be offset by an increase to the Employer 
Contribution over a period of time unless the market performs exceptionally better than projected 
(Mendell, 2015b).  The rate increase for the employer contribution would be added to the 50% 
rate increase implemented earlier in 2015 (Petersen, 2015b).  For example, the State’s portion of 
the Employer Contribution is expected to increase above current levels by $200 million in 2016-
2017 and more than $700 million by 2019-2020 (The Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2015).  
Although Governor Brown has no authority over the CalPERS Board, the Governor advocated 
that CalPERS act more aggressively by lowering the assumed ROR over five years and 
amortizing it over 20 years (Mendell, 2015a).  This five- year phased-in approach would have 
caused the State’s contribution to increase by more than $1 billion by 2020s (The Legislative 
Analyst’s Office, 2015).  In November 2015, the Board approved the Risk Mitigation Policy, 
reducing the assumed ROR from 7.5% to 6.5% over 20 years, as well as adjusting the strategic 
asset allocation target only in years of good investment returns where actual investment returns 
outperformed the existing discount rate by at least four percentage points (Petersen, 2015b).  The 
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policy is a step in the right direction; it will increase the financial sustainability of the pension 
system by gradually lowering the risks of the investments over several years.  
The Funded Ratio of CalPERS is Much Lower than Benchmarks 
CalPERS had an Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability of $93.5 billion and a Funded Ratio of 
76.3% as of the June 30, 2014 valuation.  The Funded Ratio was estimated to drop to 73.3% as 
of the June 30, 2015 valuation.  By comparison, NYSLERS had a Funded Ratio of 93.7%, the 
highest of the benchmark group.  NYSLERS’ ROR was the highest compared to the three other 
public pension plans for all the periods except for the 10-year period which the actual ROR was 
over 10%.  There were 21 years out of the 35 years (1981-2015) where the ROR for NYSLERS 
were double-digits and only three years had a negative return (2001, 2003, and 2009).  Clearly 
NYSLERS investments had solid gains which boosted the funded ratio of the plan.  NYSLERS 
was consistent about making contributions.  Between 2005 and 2014, the contributions remained 
at similar levels or increased for all the years except for 2008.  FRS followed next with an 86.5% 
funded ratio and then TRS which had an 80.2% funded ratio. 
 
CONCLUSION  
CalPERS ratio of active employees to retirees, beneficiaries and survivors is 1.3.  More of its 
members will be beginning their retirement years in the near future and CalPERS must embrace 
its fiduciary duties and ensure that investments generate returns at the appropriate risk levels to 
provide benefits to members and their beneficiaries over a long-term.  CalPERS should allocate a 
higher percentage of its asset allocation to Fixed Income.  This investment strategy would be 
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similar to NYSLRS, which was demonstrated in this paper as a retirement system that was 
financially solid and well funded.  The actuarial assumptions used for CalPERS, particularly the 
assumed ROR, cannot be overly optimistic and unattainable.   
CalPERS must be more proactive in securing financial stability for its plan and its membership.  
The current funded status is at a tipping point and could drop even lower should there be another 
market downturn.  The trustees, elected officials, plan administrators and union leaders must 
identify ways to increase the employer and employee contributions, reduce the assumed Rate of 
Return, and still provide essential services to the community while compensating the employees 
in a fair manner.  Employees must understand how they share the risk of the unfunded status and 
what concessions they can make to contribute towards financial stability.  All stakeholders must 
work together to ensure the best retirement package is available today and for future generations 
to come. 
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Table 3 Benchmark of CalPERS against the Teachers Retirement System of Texas, Florida State Retirement System, and New York State and 
Local Employees Retirement Systems.  
 
Benchmark CALPERS Teacher  Retirement 
System of Texas  
Florida State 
Retirement System 
New York State and Local 
Retirement Systems 
Number of members 
 
1.8 million 1.5 million 1.0 million  1.1 million 
Two different retirement 
systems: Employee 
Retirement System with 
approximately 1 million 
members and the Police and 
Fire Retirement System with 
just over 68,000 members 
Number of employers 
participating in the plan 
3,007 1,347 1,016 3,032 
     
Ratio of actives to 
retirees/survivors/ 
beneficiaries 
 
1.3  
 
2.2  
 
1.5 1.2  
 
Governance Structure of 
the board 
 
13 members who are 
elected by membership, 
appointed by the Governor 
or Legislature, or hold 
office ex officio.   
 
9 trustees who are chosen 
directly or indirectly by 
the Governor 
 
Governor as Chairman, 
Chief Financial Officer, 
and Attorney General 
Comptroller  
What is the Market 
Value of the 
Investments? 
$301.1 billion $128.0 billion $147.97 billion  $184.5 billion 
Is there an Investment 
Policy? 
CalPERS Total Fund Investment Policy Defined Benefit General Investment Policies 
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Benchmark CALPERS Teacher  Retirement 
System of Texas  
Florida State 
Retirement System 
New York State and Local 
Retirement Systems 
Investment Policy 
(adopted March 16, 2016 
and effective April 18, 
2016) 
Statement (effective 
October 2014) 
Investment Policy 
Statement (effective 
March 2014).   
November 2015  
Laws and Regulations 
Governing the 
Investments 
Ca Constitution, Article 
XVI, section 17  
Texas Constitution, Article 
XVI, Section 67 (a)(3) and 
Section 825.301, 
Government Code, Title 8, 
Subtitle C 
Florida Constitution 
and Florida Statutes 
Section 215.47 
 
Retirement and Social 
Security Law, Regulations of 
the New York State 
Department of Financial 
Services, and State Banking 
Law 
Asset Allocation 
 
Refer to the Findings section of the paper 
Assumed Rate of Return 
on investments  
7.5%  8% 7.65%  7.5% 
7.0% as of 9/2015 
Rate of Return on Investment 
  1-Year Return   2.4% -0.3%    3.7% 7.2% 
  5-Year Return 
 
10.7% 9.6% 11.0% 10.2% 
  10-Year Return 6.2% 6.2% 6.9% 7.1% 
  20-Year Return 7.8% 7.7% 8.1% 8.7% 
  25-Year Return   N/A 8.7% 8.7% 7.5% 
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Benchmark CALPERS Teacher  Retirement 
System of Texas  
Florida State 
Retirement System 
New York State and Local 
Retirement Systems 
Actuarial Value of Assets  $301.3 billion
1
  $133.5 billion  $143.2 billion  $184.2 billion  
Actuarial Accrued 
Liability  
 
$394.7 billion
1
 $166.5 billion  $165.5 billion  $196.5 billion  
Unfunded Actuarial 
Accrued Liability 
$93.5 billion
1
  $33.0 billion $22.3  billion $12.4 billion 
Funded Status based on 
Actuarial Value of the 
Assets 
76.3% as of 6/30/2014 
The ratio is estimated to 
drop to 73.3% as of 
6/30/2015 
80.2%   86.5%  93.7%  
 
Source:  
CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report.  
Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems comprehensive annual financial 
report fiscal year ended june 30, 2015.   
New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a).  2015 comprehensive annual financial report.    
Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 June 30, 2014 was the last actuarial valuation performed for CalPERS 
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